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“We follow reason, not the law”: disavowing the law in rural China 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent debates about the moral climate in China have focused on its citizens' purported loss of 
traditional values and interest in the public good. According to such views, Chinese society, and in 
particular its countryside, is now affected by a moral vacuum – the absence of a moral compass that 
could lead citizens' public behavior to contribute to the nation's greater good. Wedding the "moral 
vacuum" argument, the current Chinese government is reforming its judicial system with the aim of 
making it more accessible to its citizenry. The idea is that in the absence of shared moral values, the 
law and legal rights could provide new forms of ethical bonding between individuals and the 
collectivity. Widely supported by Chinese legal scholars, this new approach envisions legal 
mediation as a principled vehicle to bring the law to the countryside. Disproving the above 
narrative, this paper discusses how in rural Yunnan the law and legal rights come to be seen as 
instruments of collective disenfranchisement. The ethnography here presented reveals two things. 
First, that Yunnanese rural society is best described as enjoying a moral "plenum", not a "vacuum". 
During mediation, legal norms, communist values and traditional moral principles appear to be 
equally valid normative sources from which to draw on in the attempt to redress grievances. 
Secondly, that Chinese law, in the form of temporary use rights to local resources, is actively 
ousting out alternative regimes of resource management that are predicated on local villagers' 
participation in and responsibility for the public good [legal mediation, public good, Chinese law, 
rural protests, popular participation]. 
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Introduction 
 
On the 1st October 2014, the People's Republic of China (PRC) celebrated its sixty-fifth 
anniversary and, alongside it, six decades of relentless social transformation. In the most recent of 
these turbulent decades, Chinese citizens have attended to the dislodging of deep-seated 
expectations about life trajectories and the places people inhabit. These decades have witnessed 
high-paced urbanisation and industrialisation; the expansion of Party control into family and career 
planning; environmental degradation; and mass migration. This process has led many commentators 
of Chinese affairs – journalists, social scientists and common citizens alike (see the discussions in 
Liu 2000: 182; Brandtstädter 2009: 146-56; Yan 2009: 289; Steinmüller 2013: 19-21) –  to debate 
the current state of Chinese society in terms of an alleged lack of moral
 
values and concern for the 
common good.  
 
The mainstream narrative emerging from public debate now holds that in contemporary China no 
time honoured, collectively cherished normative order –  that is a set of normative principles which 
defines correct behaviours and provides ethical directions for living together –  has remained 
sufficiently intact to guide individual or organised behaviour. That is, Chinese people are 
increasingly seen to live in a moral and legal “vacuum” where self-interests and predatory instincts 
are left unbound. As such, so the narrative goes, public life has become something to be shunned 
rather than something one would take part in. In agreement with this reading of contemporary 
Chinese society, Xi Jinping's administration (which came into power in 2012) has put a renewed 
emphasis on the “rule of law” (fazhi) (Balme 2013: 189-90; Minzner 2013). The Xi administration 
hopes that a more effective legal system can provide a political remedy to the alleged moral 
“vacuum”, and allow the Party-State to regulate public life in the absence of shared ethical 
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principles. 
 
Challenging this overarching narrative – one that suggests a “vacuum” to be filled by centrally 
designed legal provisions –  this paper looks at how a moral and legal “plenum” is actively 
produced in the Chinese countryside through the joint effort of common citizens and low-level 
officials. Rather than depicting a society crumbling under the assault of self-interested, anti-social 
urgencies, this paper shows that ordinary life in rural China is usually collaboratively ordered 
outside the boundaries of the law and without strict central-State surveillance. Ironically, rather than 
asking to be protected by state laws, people living in the countryside feel often threatened by state 
rules and legal provisions. In fact, it is the letter of the law – my interlocutors claim – that ends up 
cornering them into a position where no citizens' participation in public life is possible, thus 
producing a public sphere devoid of care for and interest in the common good. 
 
My case study is based upon 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork in a drought-prone agricultural 
community in the south-west of China: Yancong Township (zhen) and two adjoining rural 
settlements here called Xi and Dong villages
1
. My research addresses the question of how an 
interest for the common good, if any, is kept alive in the constantly transforming Chinese 
countryside. In particular, in this paper I look at how locals cooperate to autonomously manage their 
common affairs, including the government of common local resources, such as water and land. 
Thus, this paper asks: how do common citizens succeed in coming together to regulate the public 
management of local resources in face of the divisive forces seemingly unleashed by the massive 
social and economic trasformations of the last decades?  
 
To provide a plausible answer to this question, I will first contextualise the public discourse of 
moral “vacuum” within my own fieldsite and discuss the State's countermove. I will then move to 
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the ethnography of a mediation session, showing the actual moral repertoires that are available to 
Chinese citizens to allay their grievances. In Yancong, one such repertoire is “reason” (li)2. In the 
following section I will detail the management of Yancong water infrastructure through “reason”, 
showing the collaborative, participatory and equitable nature of this technique of government. 
Lastly, I will show how legally-framed State land development projects lead local people to 
disavow the law. To their eyes, the practice of following “reason” stands in glaring opposition to the 
disempowering effects of state-backed legal instruments for managing local resources. 
 
Unruly People 
 
With a per capita annual income of 1318 RMB
3
, Yancong, a rice-growing community, is one of the 
poorest Townships of north-east Yunnan. Since 2010 the Township has been severely affected by 
drought, causing local rice production to plummet. When I first arrived there in November 2011, 
many farmers complained about the limited availability of water, and cases of water theft or assaults 
to water infrastructures were increasingly common. People working at the County Water Bureau, a 
higher-level government office where I conducted long-term participant-observation, talked 
disparagingly of Yancong's dwellers. They often described them as “unruly people” (diaomin). 
People who did not listen to reason (buting liyou) or who would “take water without permission or 
damage infrastructures just for the sake of it”. If I wanted to conduct research with them, I was told, 
I should have known from the start that these people were backward (luohou), corrupted (zhuoren) 
amoral (wu daode), and swindlers (pianzi). “You can get into trouble if you associate with the 
wrong people, and China is full of those!” I was told by one member of the Bureau. 
 
If one had to believe what Chinese media were saying around the time of my fieldwork, the above 
statements would have come across as a fair rapresentation of not just Yancong's residents, but of a 
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good portion of the Chinese citizenry. Cases of official malpractice and corruption were hitting the 
headlines on a daily basis
 
(Penny 2013). These stories told of high-ranking officials expelled from 
the Chinese Communist Party due to ethical misconduct
4
,
 
as well as of
 
common folk preying on the 
gullibility of other citizens (Yan 2009). Similarly, a series of scandals have reported how big and 
small businesses endanger their customers' health, neglect safety concerns, and pollute the 
environment (e.g. van Rooij et al. 2012: 703; Lora-Wainwright 2013: 315; Tilt 2010). State-owned 
construction companies have also courted controversy by unilaterally and coercively carry out land 
expropriation, including the relocation of entire neighbourhoods, for the mere sake of profit (e.g. 
Erie 2012). This is all in a climate where social protests had already risen to an all-time high. Many 
of these, often violent, protests have specifically targeted state mismanagement of public goods 
(Ma, Schmitt 2008: 97; Ma 2008: 35). 
 
Observers have traced back the origins of the current situation to the “opening up” (kaifang) of the 
socialist command economy during the 80s. In their view, the transition from socialist to market 
economy has inadvertently produced a feeling of displacement and loss in the moral perception of 
Chinese citizens (Yan 2003; Steinmüller 2010: 540, 2013: 219; Brandtstädter 2011: 268). Acting in 
the midst of this supposedly “grey”, morally ambiguous society (Tan 2012), both common citizens 
and party officials are keen to bend the rules to their own advantage (e.g. Zhao 2011: 201), encroach 
upon common resources, and rob the worst-off of precious assets like land and water (e.g. Judd 
1994: 27; Siu 1989: 276; Potter, Potter 1990: 331). Purportedly, Chinese citizens no longer share 
any set of normative principles that would provide ethical directions for living together (but see 
Zhang 2001: Ch8 and Oxfeld 2010). What does life under such circumstances look like? 
 
Party cadres on their brief inspection round visits to Yancong usually commented on the brazen 
carelessness reserved to public goods around Yancong –  supposedly evidenced by unfinished roads 
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and crumbling hydraulic structures – and spoke of its inhabitants' lack of civil virtues (meiyou 
shenme gongde). People working in the local government also complained that the locals did their 
best to disrupt public services, pointing to acts such as the wilful smashing of household water 
meters so that water bills cannot be properly collected, or the diversion of common irrigation 
channels to one’s own private plots. Conversely, Yancong dwellers were never ashamed to make 
open reference to the corrupt nature of the local government, accusing its personnel of embezzling 
public money for private ends. Whatever angle one might take, the Township appeared a cradle of 
vice, devoid of care for the common good. One Yancong residents commented: “Chinese attitude 
today is selfish (zisi). As they say: 'Let every man sweep the snow from before his own doors and 
not trouble himself about the frost on his neighbour's tiles' (geren zisao menqianxue, moguan taren 
washangshuang)”. 
 
Legal Remedy 
 
Of particular interest for this paper is the relation between public discourses about pervasive 
amorality and social breakdown and the practical, day-to-day management of common resources 
(e.g. land and water) at the local level. A growing body of literature has begun to address the way 
in which regimes of governance are typically informed by and legally construed around ideological 
and moralised visions of the “common good”. For example, the management of land and water 
resources – and the concomitant exclusion of common people from the enjoyment of said goods – 
is very often justified or prescribed by political or legal doctrines that presuppose some form of 
ownership and technological appropriation as “morally” superior to others (e.g. Verdery and 
Humphrey 2004; Strang, Busse 2011; Strathern 2011).  
 
In the Global South, the utilitarian imperative of achieving the greatest national common good 
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often justifies a disregard for local interests in pro-development policies (Li 2014: 591; Bakker 
2013: 284). This imperative often condemns as immoral or irrational alternative visions of 
collective advancement put into practice by the people targeted by these very policies (e.g. Flower 
2009: 40). In fact, one of the aims of this essay is to salvage such practices from a Chinese public 
discourse that vilifies everything happening at the margins of society (Steinmüller 2010: 540). In 
China, the ideological and official equation between the national interest and the common good has 
given rise to two residual categories of public discourse: corruption (tanwu) and backwardness 
(suzhidi). These two words are frequently employed by Yancong people when denouncing the 
social malaises infecting their own society. And at the same time they are the two principle “social 
bads” that the central Chinese State is actively seeking to curb. 
 
To do so, the Chinese government has in recent years reinvigorated efforts to “send the law to the 
countryside” (songfa xiaxiang). The hope here is to raise standards of accountability for 
lawbreakers and, more prosaically, to inject the system with a dose of civic concern. The political 
steps taken in this direction, however, depart consistently from the course taken previously. While 
up to the 90s, the idea had been that a procedurally strong legal system would have addressed 
widespread official and private misconduct (Brandtstädter 2013: 333), in the last decades the 
emphasis has shifted away from legal adjudication and towards non-adversarial solutions to social 
conflicts. In this respect, the Chinese State has begun to resuscitate the “dispute resolution services” 
(tiaojie jiufen fuwu) that were popular under Maoism (Minzner 2011).  
 
In a similarly manner to the ongoing revitalisation of grassroots dispute resolution practices in 
South East Asia – a revival that international organisations such as the World Bank along with 
sympathetic national governments hope will assuage conflicts triggered by increasingly skewed 
economic development (e.g. Baviskar 2003: 297; Lynch 2005; Li 2015: 103-7) – the Chinese 
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government’s provision of these services has the explicit aim of appeasing the popular perception of 
official malfeasance and of gross injustice in legal proceedings (Pareenboom 2008: 16; 
Pareenboom, He 2008: 24-28; Minzner 2011: 945; Balme 2013: 189-90). They do so by 
familiarising citizens with legal concepts such as “rights” (quanli) and the “rule of law” (fazhi), but 
without resorting to adjudication (panjue). 
 
Theoretical grounding for this legal move has arguably been provided by some of China’s most 
prominent legal scholars, some of whom are anthropologists (Zhu 2000; Zhao 2011). In recent 
years these scholars have argued that Chinese culture is already endowed with indigenous legal 
resources (bentu ziyuan) that could work as effective antidotes to the present moral decay. If 
China’s moral vacuum is to be filled, so this argument goes, the government needs to simply revive 
moral Chinese practices of persuasion (shuofu, shuohe) and social harmony (hexie). Mimicking to a 
certain extent the old western habits of indirectly governing colonies through the codification of 
“indigenous customs”(e.g. Nader 1990; Merry, Brenneis 2004) – a position that could be 
interpreted as providing a check on the more authoritarian tendencies of an unccountable 
government
5
 – the former dean of Peking University Law School Zhu Suli, in particular, has 
advocated for a legal reformist action that would make room for the cohabitation of state laws 
(falü) and Chinese “customs” (xiguanfa) (2000: 49-50, 2008).  
 
The point that Zhu Suli makes is that what might appear as backwardness and corruption to a 
proponent of the “rule of law” in the narrow sense are, in fact, “reasonable” ways of 
accommodating conflicts at the grassroots level. He therefore suggests that the State should imbue 
legal mediation with the values of such quasi-legal practices, which, if properly respected, can be 
instrumental to the project of supplementing Chinese contemporary life with an adequate moral 
compass. Importantly for Zhu Suli, this compass should be crafted towards a moral climate that is 
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“harmonised” according to the imperetives of social stability.  
 
While the idea to expand the legal services provided to the Chinese population has much to 
recommend it, the question of what type of legal system is actually being advocated by the central 
State as a solution to the Chinese social malaise remains. In contrast to the dominant narrative, this 
paper suggests that the Chinese countryside should not be seen as a mere repository of lawlessness 
and amorality in need of tidying up by legal reform. In line with Zhu Suli, this paper maintains that 
rural villagers order their daily affairs by following local rules without the help of external 
authorities. However, contrary to Zhu Suli and to the expectations of Chinese authorities hoping for 
a return to mediation to somehow “harmonise” the countryside, my ethnography shows how the 
process of sponsoring grassroots mediation is not simply integrating state laws with local customs, 
but also generating a discursive schism between the two. In Yancong, mediation produces an 
alternative political and legal order – known locally as “conforming to reason” (heli) – which is 
imagined to stand in opposition to legal standards and central state laws. Through legal mediation 
the everyday unfairness of life at the periphery of the Chinese nation is not merely appeased but 
also made apparent. 
 
From a normative “vacuum” to a normative “plenum” 
  
What does legal mediation mean in China? Usually, it means third-party negotiations where party-
controlled mediators provide non-binding counselling to claimants
6
. If settlement is not reached, the 
claimants can go on to seek the intervention of higher authorities, and have the dispute adjudicated 
through adversarial litigation culminating in a judicial ruling. In Yancong, mediation can be initiated 
by the village authorities, or by a plaintiff sending a formal “request for hearing” (shenqing) to the 
authorities. The employment of mediation in rural China is prescribed by national and provincial 
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regulations, thus it is understood by participants as a State recognised mechanism for dispute 
resolution (see Zhang, Heurlin 2014). Yet, as we shall see, the form that mediation assumes in 
practice does not fully correspond to the project championed by the government. Let me now turn 
to one particular case I studied during fieldwork. Through this case, I hope to show how a variety of 
normative resources – a moral “plenum” – is available to participants in the process of debating 
alleged violations and improper behaviour. 
 
Xi Village “court” (Renmin Fayuan – Shenpan Fating) is an unremarkable, dusty room located at 
the right-end corner of the local Village Committee's building, a grassroot institution operating 
under the purview of Yancong Government. Contrary to what their name would suggest (see Balme 
2009)
7, this “court” was not a proper tribunal, but rather a specialised fora where villagers could 
bring to the attention of the local authorities – a Mediation Committee (MC) –  their own personal 
grievances and ask for legal mediation (tiaojie jiufen gongzuo). 
 
Here, one day in August 2012, I attended the first “hearing” of a case that involved Qingmei, a 23-
year-old female farmer, and Wenke, a 18-year-old male shepherd. The case, as it was described in 
court by the Village Party Secretary Gao Zong – who was acting as the dispute mediator – was as 
follows: One day Qingmei was working on a piece of land she owned in a mountainous area not too 
far from her home. That day, Wenke was grazing his flock in the same area, when suddenly three of 
his goats entered Qingmei's plot, feeding on her crops. Qingmei tried to stop them, waving her hoe 
around, ultimately hitting the gluttonous goats. The argument that ensued between Qingmei and 
Wenke culminated in a brawl. After a week in hospital recovering from injuries she had suffered 
during the fight, Qingmei went directly to the Village Party Secretary demanding compensation. At 
the hearing, both parties declared themselves to have been severely injured during the fight. 
However, while Qingmei's wounds were still visible the day she came to court, there were no 
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apparent signs of Wenke’s injuries. Qingmei also presented a hospital's invoice showing a payment 
made by her family to cover the cost of the week she spent there recovering.  
 
During the hearing Wenke's style of defence was aggressive. He first insisted that three goats could 
not possibly do any serious damage to Qingmei's crops. Moreover, he suggested that it was not clear 
where the common grazing land (caoyuan de lianhu chengbao) ended and Qingmei’s private plot 
(ziliudi) began. Gao Zong reminded him that three goats can actually be a serious threat to farmers' 
harvest, and that the latter is the “base” (jidi) of Chinese farmers' livelihood. Wenke later went on to 
claim that Qingmei's injuries were less serious than she purported. According to him, Qingmei was 
overreacting, and he implied that her being a women lead her to misjudge the magnitude of the 
event, making a fuss of what it was a banal quarrel between a herder and a farmer.  
 
The Party Secretary appeared genuinely insulted by Wenke's sexist reasoning, and began lecturing 
him in a dry tone: “I'm not here to teach you anything boy, but it has been almost 60 years that 
women and men are equal in our China (nünan pingdeng). It is evident that you think the opposite. 
Do you know what Chinese women do for our country? They raise chicken and pigs, they till the 
land, they build houses. They also raise children like yourself! Keep this in mind: Chinese laws says 
that this lady is your equal! (Zhongguo falü guiding shuo ta he ni pingdeng).” Noticing that his 
speech had intimidated Wenke, he then adopted a less aggressive stance: “You are a smart boy, 
Wenke. You will go to Kunming as a migrant worker, and this is a very good thing for you and your 
family. Men are fallible beings (cuiruo). There is no need to repay now: when you have the sum, 
you'll pay”.  
 
Wenke was not, however, an inexperienced defendant. He held his position, arguing that he was 
even more harmed than Qingmei, that he had proof of medical bills and that he should pay only half 
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of the compensation fees. The dispute came to a halt. Gao Zong tried his best to make Wenke feel 
guilt, regret and to make him lose face. “This is one of those cases that you should feel in your 
heart, boy. Don't you have any virtue (daode)?” With a change of register, he then added: “Boy, 
there's no one here who believes you. If you don't have any clue of what the law says (ni renbuda 
falü) it is your problem. It is not me being harsh, it is the law, and you should have known it!”. The 
boy was unimpressed, and left the courtroom. 
 
In accordance with various works in legal anthropology at the junction between legal practices and 
language (Comaroff, Roberts 1981; Ch3; Silbey, Merry 1990; Nader 1990), this vignette shows that 
both Gao Zong and Wenke use language referentially, often pointing at a constellation of 
supposedly shared principles that are assumed to be reliable guide for behaviour. At the beginning 
of the mediation, Wenke immediately hinted at the flaws of the property regime in place in 
Yancong's countryside. Had the common grazing land been demarcated more clearly, he might have 
avoided leading his flock into Qingmei's land. Actually, if the plot Qingmei was working on was to 
be later classified as common grazing land, he might have ended up looking like he was the one 
defending his right of pasture. Here Wenke is exploiting his knowledge of the law to defend himself 
from allegations. 
 
Gao Zong, in response, reminded Wenke that in Communist China there exists a long tradition of 
defending farmer's access to land, and that this country is founded upon the sacrifice its peasants' 
made during the Revolution. Therefore, regardless of what the law says, access to land ought to be 
protected so that poor farmers may make a living out of it. Wenke opted then to take advantage of a 
traditional prejudice saying that Chinese women could not be treated as equal to men. While 
“patriarchism” (dananzhuyi) has long been associated with traditional Chinese thought, and 
especially with Confucianism (e.g. Wolf 1994: 251), Gao Zong felt deeply insulted by Wenke's 
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remark. A reason for Gao Zong's reaction could be found in the implicit message contained in 
Wenke's argument. Weren't both Wenke and the Party Secretary men belonging to the same poor, 
unsophisticated community? Couldn't they possibly agree on an equally unsophisticated patriarchal 
logic? 
 
Gao Zong felt they could not. To distance himself from Wenke's backward belief system, Gao Zong 
resorted to another normative repertoire, the one of the “progressive” socialist law. Chinese socialist 
law is one founded on a revolutionary thought that aims to dislodge old values and privileges from 
their traditional locus, namely rural village life. Patriarchism is one such value that needs to be 
eradicated. But immediately thereafter, Gao Zong turned to a more condescending tone, employing 
the Confucian vocabulary of virtue and human frailty to persuade Wenke into accepting a 
compensatory solution. 
 
This section has shown how during mediation more than one “normative repertoire” (Comaroff, 
Roberts 1981: 72) is recruited in efforts to bring about a resolution. Traditional believes, 
Confucianism, communist values and technical knowledge are all present and eagerly tapped by the 
people involved in negotiating disputes. My point here is two pronged. First, in line with what much 
anthropological research on law says of societies elsewhere in the world (e.g. Merry 1988), my 
interlocutors ordinarily deal with a plural normative world, one where the monopoly of legitimacy 
and uprightness is not vested into one single normative regime. Second, as I will show in the next 
section, legal mediation as it is enacted in Yancong falls short of being the principled vehicle of a 
“harmonised” moral order endorsed by the state orthodoxy. Here, villagers do not simply get taught 
about how to behave in accordance with the “laws” or “customs”, they participate into designing 
these “laws” and “customs” themselves.  
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Following Reason 
 
At this point, it may be interesting to draw a comparison with similar forms of mediation recorded 
in the anthropological literature on law. In his ethnography of the panchyat, a form of mediation 
traditionally practiced by Hindi-speaking Fiji Indians, Donald Brenneis starts from a position 
similar to that which I have assumed in the above case study of legal mediations in Yunnan. During 
panchyats, he contends, the communicative style adopted is mainly didactic, about the public 
teaching of moral “instructions” (1984: 491). Brenneis, however, moves his analysis further by 
suggesting that for the Fiji Indian communities he studied, mediation not only constitutes a source 
of normative regimes, but also appears to be a space where a form of knowledge is collaboratively 
constructed by participants (1983: 241). To Brenneis, the knowledge practice embedded within 
mediation allows for a form of politics “constructed through the propositions collaboratively stated 
by questions and witness” (1991:81). 
 
I take this proposition to be also valid for the many mediation sessions I assisted while conducting 
fieldwork. Participants in grassroots mediations – professional mediators, witnesses, cadres and 
plaintiffs alike – engage in a practice of participated government whereby ordinary issues about the 
management of common goods are actively debated and settled. Rather than an administrative 
solution to widespread bellicosity and unruliness, mediation operates as a shop floor where civic 
ideals of public participation and common good are discursively and practically assembled. To 
show how grassroots mediation can provide participants with a forum for active and creative 
participation in the ordinary government of village affairs, here I will dwell briefly on disputes 
related to the management of local water infrastructure. 
 
According to my interlocutors, since the collectivization of the countryside and the water 
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conservancy projects undertaken during the Great Leap Forward, waste water and irrigation ditches 
in Dong village have seen a long and complex chain of cooperative water schemes
8
. Local residents 
spoke of how the government of water infrastructure was once a system run by farmers (nong qilai 
jiti guanli). Starting in the 1990s, however, this system was replaced by one run by the economy 
(jingji guanli). Thereby, farmers where dispossessed of collectively owned infrastructures. Most of 
my interlocutors, for example, raised a particular case of a drinking water supply being diverted by 
the government to bring water to a newly built hydropower station thus leaving half of the villages 
surrounding Yancong without access to a safe supply of drinking water. Nevertheless, while being 
partially disenfranchised from their own system of governance, people in Dong village had still a 
role to play in running the web of concrete irrigation channels that still cross-cut much of Yancong. 
Dong villagers purposefully resorted to mediation to reinstate common rules over the government 
of this system, or to shift accountability on more reliable canal managers, so that the water could 
continue to flow undisturbed in their community. 
 
During my study of Dong Village Disputes' Archive, I collected 15 cases of mediation over issues 
of water (shuigou jiufen). These cases incorporate questions about the management of the water 
network and were brought to the MC's attention when mismanaged water harmed the claimant's 
properties or interests. A water dispute record looks like this: 
 
Cases: 1, 2007/8/23 
Applicant: Liu Wending, Man, 42, Han, Farmer, resident in Jia Family Village. 
Defendant: Sun Li, Man, 34, Han, Farmer, resident in Jia Family Village. 
Cause of Dispute: waste water channel; irrigation canal. 
 
Mediation:  
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1) The original access road is owned by the Applicant.  
2) The defendant’s property cannot be built on the surface of this road. 
3) The management (guan) of defendant’s waste water channel is given to the Applicants, as 
the defendant has considerably damaged it by pouring an excessive amount of concrete onto 
it. 
4) The canal that departs southward from both parties’ houses should be kept clean. 
5) The waste water channel can be preserved only if attached to someone's property; if 
damaged, it should be built anew, by both parties. 
6) The mediation fees are on the Applicant. 
7) From this day onward, both parties should restrain from acting unreasonably (wuli 
shengshi), if this should happen the consequences of transgression will fall on them only. 
 
As in this case, no recorded cases in my possession make explicit reference to any specific law 
that should be followed to solve the dispute. Likewise, it is not immediately clear why such a 
decision should come across as more acceptable to claimants than others. However, despite the 
lack of reference to the law, regularities in ruling can indeed be found. As local mediators and 
common villagers repeated to me many times during interviews, Yancong people redress their 
grievances by conforming to “reason” (heli), not to the law (hefa). In the present case, the 
“reason” employed to correct wilful mismanagement of common water infrastructure is to 
reallocate management rights. That is, by asking certain people to participate more in the daily 
working of the water system, the mediators shift the burden of responsibility from those who 
failed in keeping the system running onto those who brought the defective behaviour to the MC's 
attention. This is the “reason” followed by Dong Village mediators and shared by its villagers: to 
preserve the canal system, thus affording water access for the community as a whole.  
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For example, in a 2012 case, channelled water had burst onto the claimant’s land, destroying his 
crops. That portion of the channel was managed “collectively” by Mr. Bing and Mr. Su's family. 
During the discussion reported in the dispute minutes, the defendant claimed that they didn't know 
that the portion of land belonged to the plaintiff and that they discharged water without malice. The 
MC found both families to be guilty of wilfully mismanaging their allocated section, thus placing 
managerial rights with the claimant. Conversely, in a 2009 case, a water waste channel overflowed 
with filthy water after a rain storm, causing damages to the plaintiff's property. MC agreed with the 
plaintiff that the owner of the waste water channel had no intention of damaging his land, and 
thereby decided that from there on the channel would be managed collectively by both. This 
establishment is collective management was intended to prevent such overflowing from happening 
again. Similarly in another case, the manager of a canal, which had not received water for a long 
period of time, was accused by a neighbour of mismanagement when water suddenly flowed 
through the canal and seeped into the neighbour’s basement. The MC found the manager not guilty, 
but asked him to take responsibility for cleaning the canal and the neighbour's basement.  
 
Dong Village MC show an interest in keeping compensation in water-related cases marginal (only 
one out of 15 shows a compensatory solution), preferring to allocate managerial rights onto more 
scrupulous villagers, who will guarantee better supervision. The refurbishment, expansion or 
alteration of immovable property also features prominently as a cause of water related disputes. In 5 
cases present in the dataset, the MC explicitly mentioned that “old ditches” (gugou) when affected 
by the construction or expansion of houses and roads should be reconstructed and that the direction 
of the flow should not be affected. What preoccupies the mediators the most is to preserve the 
waterways. Yancong's irrigation system is a complex network of old ditches that lacks complete 
mapping. Encroaching on such canals is a serious threat to factual water delivery, and thus should 
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be protected no matter who is involved in the dispute. In a 2007 case, a group of villagers asked the 
MC to mediate a dispute against a development company which was about to cover an old canal. 
The MC negotiated with the company, persuading it to build a new channel beside the new road, 
thus replacing the old one with a more efficient infrastructure. 
 
These cases show how local mediators and common citizens engage with water management, 
producing solutions – fully endorsed by the villagers and followed strictly – that are deemed 
“reasonable”. Reason here refers to a set of principles which works to the preservation of the water 
infrastructures and to their accountable management. These cases also show that the Yunnanese 
countryside far from being “backwards”, is a place where progressive and participatory solutions to 
local problems are found without direct state intervention and without explicit reliance on any state 
laws. Yancong villagers achieve good government by taking part in and assuming responsibility for 
the smooth reproduction of the social arrangements that give order to their community's daily life.  
 
A Popular Protest 
 
In the final section, I will move to a popular protest against the local government I assisted during 
fieldwork. In this final vignette, the plurality of normative orders I described previously come into 
violent contact. While “reason” is the native term used to describe politically valid solutions to 
problems affecting the village community, state law comes into the village as a self-serving 
discourse adopted to legitimise state development projects that are unilaterally approved, that is 
without villagers participation. 
 
A few months after my arrival in Yancong, the local authorities were about to launch the 
construction of a new government compound. The amount of land that the government was 
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reclaiming was almost 80 mu
 
(13 acres). The land being reclaimed had originally been allocated to 
eight families who had been farming the land. The project was to cost the local and county 
governments almost 4 million renminbi, and aimed to provide shelter for 250 government officials 
and their families.  
 
It was with the inauguration ceremony that the villagers' opposition to the project was made public. 
That day I exited the hotel, where I was lodged temporarily, to be surprised by a huge crowd silently 
stationed in front of the main construction site. One hundred meters to their right a yellow and blue 
grader, followed by a bulldozer and a numbers of other heavy equipment vehicles were patiently 
lined up along the motorway, facing the toll gate. This stifling sight – the imminent arrival of a 
horde of land-trampling machines – gave the scene a stillness fraught with unvoiced expectation. 
The crowd was composed of more than a hundred men, women and children. People stood hand in 
pocket with somewhat dumbfounded looks, all the time jostling around in an effort to find the best 
angle from which to see what was about to happen. Dotting the assembly with red helmets were the 
construction workers, who smoked carelessly and chit-chatted unimpressed by the large crowd.  
 
Notably, as a measure of containment, a ring of troopers was set in place. Outnumbering the 
civilians almost two to one, they watched the crowd alertly, stopping newcomers from joining in. At 
specific points along the road the police (gong'an) had set up checkpoints. Eventually, the grader 
arrived at its final destination. Its first move would have been to unload a load of massive stones on 
the paddy field right behind the crowd. Then something happened. A woman broke away from the 
crowd, walking slowly towards the vehicle. Looking straight into the eyes of the man piloting the 
grader, she climbed the vehicle without opposition, reaching for the cabin. Face to face with the 
pilot, she exchanged a few words with him, apparently scolding him and trying to discourage the 
man from completing his work. A moment after, the lady turned to the crowd and raising her voice 
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decalred, “This land earns me two hundred kuai a year!” The assembly stood silent. 
 
After a few seconds of bafflement, I decided to take pictures of what was going on. The vehicle was 
now being surrounded by policemen, who were asking the lady to get off the cabin and to refrain 
from creating further nuisance. Suddenly, my camera was lowered by a stranger's hand. A 
policewoman warned me: “Look, it'd be better if you just got out of the way. It is dangerous over 
here. These people are violating the law. Today we are inaugurating an important state project, and 
the due compensation has been already given out. This was all done according to the law (shi an 
guojia de falü guize xingzhi de). This is nothing more than a small group of lawbreakers (fanfa de 
ren)”. Unable to take pictures, or even to watch the unfolding protest, I left. 
 
During the days that followed the public protest, I probed my interlocutors for the reasons behind its 
staging. One interlocutor openly complained about the conceit of the State's development initiatives 
not requiring any consultation with the affected population. “That plot of land was registered as 
'convertible' (zhuanyong), but look, when the government decides that it wants to do something, it 
simply does it, without even bothering to inform us of what and why. Saying it is about the law is 
beyond the point, the problem is that they decide on their own, they just do as they please”. With 
others, I inquired as to whether the law could be brought on the villagers' side by suing the 
government. “You have to understand that the requisition was lawful (an falü). It is because of the 
temporary use of land (zanyongquan). What could that possibly mean? The Law in China is another 
way for the government to make a profit. There's nothing to be gained in taking the case to the 
court, they are just another branch of the government (zhengfu de zhidu)”. 
 
For the present discussion, there is one interesting point to be taken out from the above comments 
about land requisitioning. In China, land development takes place within an ambiguous 
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administrative framework (see Ho 2005: Ch2; Pils 2006). Starting with 1982 – the year when 
decollectivization took place in Yancong – the redistribution of land was carried out according to 
the number of members is each households. Farmers were required to enter into a 30-year lease 
contract with the State, which remains the “ultimate” legal owner of all Chinese land (Ho 2001: 
396-7). For this reason farmers in Yancong only have “use rights” over land. But the State does not 
need to wait for leases to expire in order to terminate these “rights”. Rather, when the state needs 
land, it can simply take the land from its citizens, and the farmers have no choice but to accept the 
stipulated compensation. As with many other such cases documented in the literature (Zweig 2000; 
Ho 2001; Cai 2008), the process of requisitioning usually generates strenuous resistance because it 
is often carried out regardless the former leaser's consent. 
 
The fact that “use rights” could be suspended at any given time and the land turned back to the 
state, is one of the reasons behind popular scepticism toward State laws in Yancong. Along the lines 
of Mary Gallagher's description of how Chinese citizens develop a form of “disenchantment” 
towards the law out through their experience with it (2006), my informants expressed their disbelief 
towards the law, disavowing legal provision as an empowering or emancipatory tool. To fully 
understand why this is so, consider what my interlocutors explained to me about land 
requisitioning. When the land is taken from villagers' hands, villagers are also deprived of the 
possibility to meaningfully contributing to the public goods of their community. Participating in the 
administration of local water infrastructure becomes impossible as the community expects those to 
whom “managerial rights” over irrigation canals are allocated to actually work the land on which 
the infrastructure is located. 
 
Thus, lawful requisition damages Yancong villagers twice. It takes away what is perceived by 
villagers to be a crucial asset, i.e. land, and it also excludes them from contributing to and caring for 
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their own community. This point could be better clarified by going back briefly to the archive 
material I collected in Dong Village. In the “requests of hearing” in my possessions, many include 
villagers complaints about their exclusion from participating into the public life of their own 
community. In one “request of hearing” signed by “all villagers” (quanti cunmin) of Dong Family 
Village the applicants demanded the suspension or redirection of a segment of a highway. While 
explicitely asking for the construction company to extend consultations about the project with all 
villagers, the applicants also demanded a local political figure, whom they refer to as the 
“unmentionable” (bugan baolu xingming de ren), to publicly apologise to the local community for 
trying to exclude other villagers from negotiation with said company.  
 
I wish that the Village Committee's comrades now come to our village, redressing all other villagers' 
cases, asking this unmentionable individual to step forward. I want him to say in front of everyone, in 
the light of day how things really went. He has to say that we deserved [consultation and 
compensation] and that we did not get anything more than that. We call this “when a noble man loves 
wealth he/she has a noble way of obtaining it, when a small man loves it, he/she resorts to tyranny” 
(junzi aicai quzhi youdao; xiaoren aicai hengxing badao). 
 
Finally, this is how one of my closest interlocutors during fieldwork sought to make sense of the 
progressive disenfranchisement of Yancong villagers: “They take your land and then you don't have 
a place where your voice can be heard, nor a place where to give you version of the facts (you hua 
wuchu shuo, you yan wuchu shen). For the government this is “rightful conduct” (an fagui de 
xingwei), for us, we just call it “unreasonable” (wu daoli de xingwei).” In a way, this comment 
seems to suggest that, if anything, the Chinese moral vacuum is one actively produced by state-
backed legal instruments, and not one resulting from their absence. 
 
Conclusions 
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As a way to fill China’s supposed moral “vacuum” and to control the negative fallouts of decades of 
unrestrained development, the Chinese State is currently undertaking a series of legal reforms. The 
movement towards legal mediation is conceived as a key component of these reforms. Apparently, 
the aim of such a movement is to provide better access to justice for rural communities, and to make 
the “backward” and “corrupt” governance of rural China finally accountable to its citizens. 
 
However, as we have seen in this paper, legal mediation cannot solely be read as a vehicle for the 
central state to usher in much needed legal remedies to official malpractices, or to revive traditional 
values in the face of a public life devoid of shared moral principles. In Yancong, common people 
approach legal mediation not as the provider of legal and moral guidance, but rather as a counter-
public where alternatives to state laws can be collaboratively discussed and crafted. In showing the 
progressive and creative ways in which common citizens and local officials collaboratively strive 
for consensual and fair government of village affairs, this paper joins the Chinese anthropologists 
who have recently begun to approach legal mediation ethnographically, and to investigate the 
plurality of legal life in the Chinese countryside (e.g. Zhu 2000; Zhao 2011; also Pirie 2013). 
 
Yet, my own account of legal mediation in rural Yunnan differs considerably from the line of 
argument advanced by scholars such as Zhu Suli, who see mediation as a space where central and 
local government, public expectations and private needs can be reconciled. I want also to move 
away from the received anthropological understanding of mediation as a governmental move to 
muzzle popular calls for justice (e.g. Merry 1990, Roberts 2009). While there would certainly be 
some truth to such a reading of the cases I have presented here – many instances of mediation in 
China might, for example, be seen as the reinstatement of Confucian values – here I have 
emphasised the positive side of mediation in one-Party China. I have tried to demonstrate how legal 
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mediation in Yancong is capable of producing “a political ideology that is counter-hegemonic” 
(Nader 1990: 307). 
 
Following Don Brenneis, I have argued that in Yancong the practice of “following reason” as it 
unfolds during mediated discussion makes apparent the unilaterality of state interventions and lays 
bare the pro-development bias that is hard-wired into the Chinese legal framework. It is the law – 
my Chinese interlocutors maintain – to considerably eschew and neglect villagers' interests for the 
“common good”. Here, rather than Zhu Suli's, it is the work of the Chinese Anthropologist Zhao 
Xudong that comes to mind: “there are two ways of thinking about the relationship between custom 
and state laws: to the intrusion of state laws into the rural countryside, one should add the ensuing 
resistance to such intrusion”(2008: 239). In relation to this, one thing emerges from this essay. The 
recourse to mediation as an ordering mechanism of village life is being interpreted by common 
people as creating a polarization between how the law works and how disputes are instead resolved 
at the village level. This polarization is made of two normative orders: on the one hand there is the 
“law” (hefa) on the other “reason” (heli).  
 
For the people of Yancong, the law remains very much an “unfulfilled promise” (Merry, Brenneis 
2004: 24). The law provides a set of rules similar to those in the normative repertoire they ordinarily 
refer to when discussing daily affairs such as water management, but it falls short of achieving what 
reason can: the consensual government of public goods. Thus, the ethnographic material presented 
here is intended to debunk the overriding myth of social collapse, moral decay and unrestrained 
selfishness which seems to have captured the imagination of common Chinese citizens as well as 
that of professional observers of China. And yet, the very same  material lends itself to moderating 
my own interlocutors view that the law is there only for the Chinese government “to make a profit”. 
The idea that all citizens, regardless of their gender, ethnicity or status are legally entitled to fair 
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treatment and are allowed to have a voice on matters of public interests is genuinely seeping into 
daily conversations and the common sense of rural China. As described above, when addressing 
Wenke, Party Secretary Gao Zong made wide reference to the Chinese law in force, and publicly 
praised its emancipatory power, which to his mind has made an immense contribution to the 
advancement of Chinese society.  
 
Nonetheless, the ethnographic material of this essay contributes to recent debates about the advent 
of the rights-era in China (e.g. Perry 2008, Li 2009) and in the Global South (Ghai, Cottrell 2010; 
Fu, Gillespie 2014), by suggesting a more nuanced picture of the dissemination of law into the 
countryside of many developing countries. Following similar works in anthropology at the juncture 
of the study of property, rights and development, I have suggested that formal, state-backed legal 
rights may be adopted to allocate not just the benefits but the burdens of development (e.g. Verdery 
2004: 140). As Yancong villagers remarked, the crucial question is not if legal provisions and 
practices are being currently popularised by the government, but what type of legal provisions and 
practices these are. In fact, some of these legal provisions could actually work against, rather than 
with, the idea that the law is there to empower common citizens. 
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Notes 
 
A deep thanks to the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation, the Chinese Scholarship Council, the 
Universities' China Committee in London and the John Wright Memorial Trust for support of this 
project, for the guidance of Charles Stafford, Stephan Feuchtwang, Francesca Bray and Laura Bear; 
and the thoughtful comments by Annelise Riles, Chika Watanabe, Mark Schuller, Tim McLellan, 
Giulia Zoccatelli, all the participants of the 2014 CEFC conference in Beijing and PoLAR’s 
anonymous reviewers. 
 
1. Due to confidentiality agreements, I will make use of pseudonyms throughout the paper. 
2. Li, “reason” and heli, litt. "conforming to reason, reasonable". It has to be noted here, that 
differently from what the English translation of the term may lead to imply, Chinese 
speakers do not use it to refer to "the process of uncovering essences of which particulars 
are instances", that is to deductive reasoning, but to that of thinking and acting according to 
patterns of relationships as mediated by tradition (Hall, Ames 1999: 157; also Cabestan 
2005:49). In that, the term has strong Confucian overtones. Moreover, within China's own 
debate about the indigenous philosophical sources of law, "reason" in my interlocutors' 
sense stands also in opposition with the idea of reasonable "standards" (lü) promulgated by 
the Legalist tradition (see Peerenboom 2002: 33-4). As the remainder of this paper will 
show, it is within this traditional debate that the practice of following "reason" acquires 
meaning for my interlocutors. 
3. Yancong Township Government data. At the time of fieldwork 1 RMB equalled to 0,6 USD. 
4. The most recent and discussed cases at the time of fieldwork was Bo Xilai's. See for 
instance Flora Sapio's piece at http://www.thechinastory.org/2012/08/law-as-liturgy-the-
show-but-do-not-tell-case-of-gu-kailai/, accessed 7 September 2015. 
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5. I am grateful to Tim McLellan for pointing out this to me. 
6. This paper focuses on what Chinese legal scholars usually call "people's mediation" (renmin 
tiajie jizhi). Under the current administrative regime, this is a mechanism of dispute 
resolution formally distinct from "judicial mediation" (susong tiaojie jizhi), in that, with the 
former, mediation is administered by local party cadres and few appointed assistants, rather 
than by the courts. Moreover, the decisions taken by people's mediators are not enforceable 
(meiyou zhifa quanli) and are usually centered on compensatory solutions (see Zhao 2009: 
64-66). The MC of Xi Village is composed of five members, three of which are members of 
the local Village Committee. The remaining two are appointed assistants, both of whom are 
“group leaders” (xiaozuzhang) elected in small constituencies. Assistants are in charge of 
filling the disputes forms during mediations and keeping the disputes archive in order. To be 
eligible for the job, assistants have to attend an official exam on administrative procedures, 
laws and regulations every year. In Yunnan, mandatory legal training sessions, called “cadre 
training in social stability through the rule of law” (fazhi weiwen ganbu peixun) are offered 
every few months by the relevant County Civil Affair Bureau. 
7. The reasons behind this misnomer were not complitely clear. The local Party Secretary 
claimed authorship of its erroneous use. He explained that the term "court" (fayuan) proved 
capable of inculcating a sense of acquiescence into the applicants, making positive 
resolution likelier. 
8. The Great Leap Forward (GLF), in Chinese Dayuejin, was a mass campaign organised by 
the Communist Party aimed at rapidly transforming the country's agrarian economy into one 
based on heavy industries. The GLF produced hideous consequences. In only four years, an 
estimated 36 million people died of starvation. 
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